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THE ANTEPENULTIMACY OF THE BEGINNING
IN HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC

David Gray Carlson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the single most perplexing problem in Hegel's Science of
Logic is the status of its beginning.
Hegel famously insisted that philosophy must be self-grounding.
It cannot start from givens. For Hegel, presupposition is the enemy of
science. "[S]tupid—I can find no other word for it," he remarked.'
Accordingly, if Hegel's own beginning rests on unjustified presupposi
tion, then his project is defeated at the start. This is a problem Hegel
worried about and claimed to have solved.^
Hegel is usually read as excusing his presuppositional beginning by
making his first step the very last step of the Logic. On this interpreta
tion, the beginning is admittedly a contingency or a choice by the sub
jective will of the philosopher,^ but the first step is proven when it
becomes the last step in the logic. As Hegel puts it. The essential re
quirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a
pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be within itself
a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first.
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1 G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 41-42 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969) [hereinaf
ter SL]; G.W.F. HEGEL, WISSENSCHAFT DER LOGIK 21 (1975) [hereinafter WL].
2 See MICHAEL N. FORSTER, HEGEL AND SKEPTICISM (1989); William Maker, Beginning,
in ESSAYS ON HEGEL'S LOGIC 36 (George di Giovanni ed., 1990).
3 Hegel remarks, "All that is present is simply the resolve ... to consider thought as such.
SL, supra note 1, at 70; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54. See also G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC
§ 17 (William Wallace trans., 1975) ("To speak of a beginning of philosophy has a meaning
only in relation to a person who proposes to commence the study, and not in relation to the
science as science."); CLARK BUTLER, HEGEL S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY 1
(1996) ("the project of defining the absolute ... is certainly presupposed.").
4 SL, supra note 1, at 71; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 56. Compare with the Philosophy of Right.
Philosophy forms a circle. It has an initial or immediate point—for it must begin
somewhere—a point which is not demonstrated and is not a result. But the starting
point of philosophy is immediately relative, for it must appear at another end-point as
a result. Philosophy is a sequence which is not suspended in mid-air; it does not
begin immediately, hut is rounded off within itself.
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I would like to propose a refinement, however. I wish to defend
the proposition that die last, ultimate step of the Science of Logic is not
the first step. Rather, the first step of the logic is the antepenultimate
step—the third from the last—in the Science of Logic as a whole.
This interpretation allows for an answer to a question that has
bothered readers of Hegel's first chapter on pure being. There, Hegel
emphasizes the identity of being and nothing. If these are identical, how
can their difference be discerned? The question boils down to this:
Where does difference come from?^ If one thing is clear, the result of
the identity of being and nothing is becoming—a concept that depends
on a difference between being and nothing. Becoming, Hegel empha
sizes, is "a movement in which both [being and nothing] are distin
guished . . .
Yet, in the obliterative regime of pure being, how can
difference be accounted for?
If we see Hegel as beginning with the antepenultimate step in his
logical system, we can provide a ready answer to the origin of difference,
on which becoming depends. On my interpretation, difference is pre
supposed, as Hegel's critics have alleged. What is different in becoming
is absolute knowing (the ultimate step) and pure immediacy (the ante
penultimate step). Becoming summarizes the difference between these
two—not the difference between being and nothing as such. To state
this point in slightly different terms, pure being was supposed to be
absolute knowing—the Understanding s propositional summary of it.
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPFFY OF RIGHT § 2 (Allen W. Wood ed., 1993)
(footnote omitted).
5 John Burbidge, among others, poses this question. See, e.g., JOHN W. BURBIDGE, HEGEL
ON LOGIC AND REUGION: THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 14 (1992) ("But from
what does this second moment of difference and disappearance arise?"). Charles Taylor, whose
book did much to reverse the eclipse of Hegel's work in the twentieth century, finds this point a
fatal flaw in the Logic. He writes;
[TJhe derivation of Becoming here is not as solid as that of Dasein. This is the first,
but not the last place in the Logic where Hegel will go beyond what is strictly estab
lished by his argument, because he sees in the relation of concepts a suggestion of his
ontology
But of course as probative arguments these passages are unconvincing.
They fail, as strict conceptual proof, however persuasive they are as interpretations for
those who hold Hegel's view of things on other grounds. Thus, in this case, the
notion of becoming imposes itself supposedly because of the passage from Being to
Nothing and back; but this is a passage which our thought is forced to when we
contemplate either . . . |W]e cannot trade on this principle at this stage.
CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 233 (1975) (footnote omitted). Taylor's plaint is that the movement
between Being and Nothing can only be "for us" and must exceed the bounds of the sparse
logical development available at the end of the first chapter.
6 SL, supra note 1, at 83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67.
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But it ended up being nothing at all—a failure/ If there is a difference
between being and nothing, it can only be discerned from a perspective
that remembers absolute knowing and compares pure nothing as the
result of the attempt to summarize absolute knowing in an immediate
way.
To see how Hegel's Anfang is antepenultimate, we begin—in the
style of Harold Pinter or the film noir Memento—at the end. To turn
the tables on Leonard Nimoy, only by recalling the future may we com
prehend the past.
II.

HEGEL'S LAST CHAPTER

Hegel's last chapter in the Science of Logic is entitled "The Absolute
Idea." Generally speaking, idea is the negative unity of subject and ob
ject. Throughout the last third of the Science of Logic—the Subjective
Logic—the notion or concept {Begrijf) theorizes itself. It produces an
objective account of its subjective self by transporting itself from subject
into predicate. This occurs in the chapter entitled syllogism {Schluf),
which is perhaps better translated as "inference."® In effect, the subject
infers its own objectivity. Yet, it finds itself alienated from its self-infer
ence and enters into a subject/object relation.
Idea is the dynamic quality that both subject and predicate share:
each on its own logic has no right against the other. Each sacrifices itself
on behalf of the other, pointing to the other as the source of its being.
Idea is the common element of self-sacrifice—the inability of any positivized concept to maintain itself against its other.
Absolute idea arises when both the true (or thinking) and the good
(or doing) give up their pretensions. What ends up being true is that
Kantian philosophy is a failure. The truth is that there is no thing-initself; it is just an illusion that passes away like any other appearance.^
The good (or practical) idea, in contrast, is the obliteration of anything
7 It is possible to see Pure Being as the form of Absolute Knowing and Pure Nothing as the
content of it. The job of form is to disappear in favor of a deeper truth. And nothingness is the
deeper truth. SLAVOJ 2IZEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A PO
LITICAL FACTOR 53 (1991).
8 "It is evident that the term 'syllogism' is the worst possible translation for the German
word Schluf, which does not signify the well-known scholastic technique for reaching a conclu
sion, hut rather the 'issue,' the 'unification,' the 'reconciliation' of the artificial distinctions of
the understanding." EUGENE FLEISCHMANN, LA SCIENCE UNIVERSELLE OU LA LOGIQUE DE
HEGEL 266 (1968) (author's translation).
9 SL, supra note 1, at 785; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 440-41.
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that stands in the way of the subject's freedom. The good is action, and
"[a]ll action presupposes a reality 'alien' to the doer
"[Ajction,
in addition, "treats the world as an empty receptacle for the actualiMtion of its subjective purposes . . . .
The true good, then, is the
realization that the only obstacle to the subject's freedom and seltknowledge is the very falsehood that the subject manufactured in theo
rizing about itself. The good and the true each sacrifice themselves; this
commonality shared by the true and the good is absolute idea.
Absolute idea is also called method. From the foregoing account of
self-sacrifice and self-erasure, it should be clear that method is very, very
negative. The method is that all affirmative propositions must obliterate
themselves as inadequate to their own object. The Science of Logic, then,
is thoroughly Spinozist in nature. For Spinoza, 'fdjeterminateness is ne
gation . . . ; this true and simple insight establishes the absolute unity of
substance."'^ So it is for Hegel, with the key difference that Hegel's
substance is so negative that it positivizes itself, only to dissolve its posi
tive implication.
Like all concepts in the Science of Logic, absolute idea is put
through the gauntlet of three logical steps. The first is the step of the
Understanding. The Understanding makes immediate propositions.
"The understanding considers all encountered beings ... to be at peace,
fixed, limited, univocally defined, individual, and positive.'"^ To pro
duce this stable, reliable account of reality and in order to make sense of
the materials before it, the Understanding must always leave something
out—reality is ultimately dynamic, but the Understanding is static.
Dialectical Reason is the critique of the Understanding. It empha
sizes the omitted materials that the Understanding left out, in order to
show that the Understanding's proposition is the opposite of what it
ought to be. Dialectical Reason is in the business of remembering the
logical sequence that the Understanding suppresses. Memory is the
10 HERBERT MARCUSE, HEGEL'S ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICITY 298 (Seyla
Benhabib trans., 1987).
11 Id. at 169.
,
12 SL, supra note 1, at 536; 2 WL. supra note 1, at 164. See Letter L from Benedict de
Spinoza to Jang Jettis Qune 2, 1674), in 2 THE CHIEF WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA 36970 (R.H.M. Elwes trans., 1951).
13 MARCUSE, supra note 10, at 10.
14 The past is no chronological past, as logical process is not a historical process. For exam
ple, Hegel refers to essence as "timelessly past - being." SL, supra note 1, at 389; 2 WL, supra
note 1, at 3. See also BUTLER, supra note 3, § 112 ("Essence we may certainly regard as past

2004]

THE ANTEPENULTIMACY OF THE BEGINNING

229

stuff that dialectical dreams are made of.^^ Dialectical Reason is tanta
mount to experience,^® in that theory is shown to be inconsistent with
the real world known to exist beyond the latest theory.
Yet Dialectical Reason does not just negate a positive theory. With
Hegel, nothing is always something; dialectical negativity is just as posi
tive as that which it critiques. If, according to Dialectical Reason, the
Understanding has suppressed materials in order to make a positive pro
position, Dialectical Reason must positivize the suppressed materials. It
therefore replicates the fault laid upon the doorstep of the
Understanding.' ^
The third step—Speculative Reason—brings together the prior, di
verse steps of Understanding and Dialectical Reason, pointing out that
they share a commonality or identity as well as a difference. Indeed,
their commonality is their difference. In other words, each side positivizes material and so leaves aside, or expels, the negative, from which it
purports to be different. It is this excluded negative (difference) that
Speculative Reason exploits. Speculative Reason is constantly bringing
this commonality to the fore.
The three-step process is then repeated. What Speculative Reason
produces is interpreted by the Understanding. This interpretation is
one-sided. Once again, something is always left out, which generates
further steps in the Logic. The move from Speculative Reason to the
proposition of the Understanding is always retrogressive. In Leninist
terms, it is always two steps forward after one step back. "[Ajdvance is a
retreat into ground. . ., " as Hegel puts it.'® Nevertheless, as the Under
standing interprets the material at hand, the propositions of the Under
standing become more sophisticated as the Logic progresses. By the
Being, remembering however meanwhile that the paat is not utterly denied, but only laid aside
and thus at the same time preserved.").
15 JOHN MCCUMBER, THE COMPANY OF WORDS: HEGEL, LANGUAGE AND SYSTEMATIC
PHILOSOPHY 123 (1993) ("[F]or Hegel, thinking—and especially philosophical thinking—is
basically a highly sophisticated way of remembering—or, as Hegel puts it, intelligence is cogni
tive only insofar as it is recognitive.") (footnote omitted).
I<5 KENNETH R. WESTPHAL, HEGEL'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM: A STUDY OF THE AIM
AND METHOD OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 130 (1989).
iz This double nature of Dialectical Reason means that Hegel's triadic system is arguably
tetrachotomous. SL, supra note 1, at 836; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 498. In the quadratic case,
Dialectical Reason is counted twice from the perspective of Speculative Reason, which sees Dia
lectical Reason as self-alienated. SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE
OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 79-80 (1999).
18 SL, supra note 1, at 71; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 56.
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time the Understanding reaches the mesne realm of Essence, ^1 its pro
positions are negative and dialectical in nature. In effect, the Under
standing transforms itself into Dialectical Reason. By the time the
Understanding reaches the realm of Notion, it sees things speculatiw y.
Understanding thus transforms itself into Speculative Reason.^® The
Science of Logic ends when the Understanding, Dialectical Reason, and
Speculative Reason converge in absolute idea. Taken together, they are
method.
.
Because all that exists is the implosion of appearance, the
theme of the Science of Logic is that there is no mysterious "beyond" to
the realm of appearances.^" It is appearances all the way down, and
appearance must erase itself in favor of a beyond that turns out not even
to be there.2' ^ Hegel remarks in the Phenomenology, "behind the socalled curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is
nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order
that we may see, as that there may be something behind there which can
beseem""
.jr.
Aphanisis—disappearance of the subject—is the very idea of the
Science of Logic. For Hegel, this aphanisis takes on a special meaning at
the advanced level of idea. To see why, it is necessary to drop back ^d
consider the very core of Hegel's system-the true infinite, which mjes
its official appearance in the second chapter of the Science of Lope, i he
true infinite plays off the logical implication of finitude. A finite thing,
by its own logic, must come to an end. Otherwise, it would not be
finite. When it does end, the thing has become what it ought to benothing. Yet, for Hegel, nothing is, after all, something. If the finite
thing passes away, the memory of it remains. The finite thing obtains
an ideal existence when it ceases to be. Yet, in its ideal form, being is
subject to recollection. The German for recollection is Emnerung,
19 For this reason, "self-contradiction comes in degrees." FORSTER, supra note 2, at 140.
20 See JEAN HYPPOUTE, LOGIC AND EXISTENCE 90 (Leonard Lawlor & Amit Sen trans.,

1997) ("The only secret, however, is that there is no secret."); ROBERT B PIPPIN, HEGEL S
IDEALISM: THE SATISPACTIONS

OP

SELP-CONSCIOUSNESS 206 (1989) ('[T]he

this section is to argue that there is literally

nothing'hesyonp or

behind or

human experience of the world of appearances, and certainly not
FThwI
ROSEN G.W.F. HEGEL: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OP WISDOM 44 ( 97 ) (
is for Hegel nothing 'behind' that process, no hidden source or God from which Being
'"?E2ANNO BENCIVENGA, HEGEL'S DIALECTICAL LOGIC 41 (2000) ("Reality is structure
(form) all the way down;").
22 G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY

OP

,
10771
SPIRIT. 9 165, at 103 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977).
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which can also be translated as "inwardization." True infinity is there
fore the process of inwardization. Its place in the Science of Lo^c is the
very portal from reality to ideality. In effect, ideality constitutes the
memory of what was {Wesert). The true infinite becomes what it ought
to be—hut it also remains what it was. It is a unity of its finite self and
its beyond. The true infinite therefore constantly removes itself from
self-presence to a beyond—and it brings its beyond into its own pres
ence. This double movement of cancellation and preservation is fa
mously called sublatiow^^ what Slavoj Zizek calls the "chiasmic exchange
of properties."^^ The idea in sublation is that the finite thing invests
itself into the beyond when it ceases to be, and the beyond invests itself
into present thought when it ceases to be. In effect, both the finite
thing and its shadowy beyond renounce their being and assign it to their
other.
With the advent of absolute idea, the very idea of a beyond be
comes untenable. In absolute idea, there is no longer a place to which
the true infinite can withdraw. At this point, Hegel says, the distinction
between form and content falls apart. Absolute idea is absolute form,
"each of whose moments is within itself the totality and hence, as indif
ferent to the form, is the complete content of the whole.
At the point
where it is understood that there is no beyond, self-sacrificing idea can
only return to itself, since there is, at this point, no other. Vanishing
form is content at this stage. The point is sacrifice of self, for self.
Yet, as I have said, absolute idea must play out the three moments
of the Understanding, Dialectical Reason, and Speculative Reason. In
deed, these moments literally are the Understanding, Dialectical Reason
and Speculative Reason. The moments identified in the last chapter are
23 "Sublation" is a translation of Aufhebung. The English term is actually derived from
chemistry. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, sublation is "[a] precipitate suspended in
a liquid, especially urine." Thanks to the English translators of Hegel, it also refers to the
destruction and preservation of logical moments by the more progressive moment which it gen
erates. This translative choice has been laid at the doorstep of Geoffrey Mure, an Oxford com
mentator from the middle of the century. ERROL E. HARRIS, AN INTERPRETATION OP THE
LOGIC OF HEGEL 30 (1983); see G.R.G. MURE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL 35 (1965) ('"Sublated' will serve as a translation.").
24 SIAVOJ 2I2EK, supra note 7, at 39-41. A chiasmus is the inversion of the order of syntac
tical elements in the second of two juxtaposed and syntactically parallel phrases or clauses. An
example: "All professors are clever men, but clever men aren't all professors;" WALTER NASH,
RHETORIC: THE WIT OF PERSUASION 114 (1989).
25 SL, supra note 1, at 531; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 158.
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method itself—each one moment implying all the others as well as
itself.^^
The first step in the analysis of absolute idea is the antepenultimate
step of the Science of Logic and, I contend, the true beginning for the
Science of Logic. This is the step of immediacy. It represents the Under
standing as such.
The second step is mediation—all the mediations there are. This
is the dialectical step in which identity is paired with difference (though,
covertly. Dialectical Reason actually compares two identities). The sig
nificance of mediation is that absolute idea is revealed to be an active,
dialectic thinker that thinks itself. As such, it is personality, something
that Hegel has declared to be missing in Spinoza's account of sub
stance—"a defect which has been the main cause of hostility to Spi
noza's system . . . .
For Spinoza, cognition is external to substance. What is finite is
not derived from substance but remains alien to it. Finite concepts can
be dissolved and traced back to substance, but Spinoza cannot travel in
the opposite direction by deriving such concepts from subst^ce. Ac
cordingly, Hegel finds that Spinoza's notions of substance, profound
and correct as they are, are [mere] definitions, which are tmmedtately
assumed at the outset of the science."^® The absolute cannot be a first.
It must be the result.
For Hegel, the concept thinks itself dynamically, and this means it
is person-like; "The highest, most concentrated point is tht pure person
ality which, solely through the absolute dialectic which is its nature, no
less embraces and holds everything within itself because it makes itself the
supremely free—the simplicity which is the first immediacy and Univer
sality."^^ Personality implies life, but also the cognition of being alive.
Life is immediate idea—"impenetrable atomic subjectivity.Life ends
up standing for self-sacrifice. There can only be life in general if indi
vidual lives terminate in death. Cognition—the second, dialectical por
tion of idea^i—is mediated idea. It cognizes itself as Life and so, too, it
26 As John Burbidgc puts it, "method identifies its own internal conditions, making no
reference to anything external." JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL'S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A
COMMENTARY 217 (1981).
27 SL, supra note 1, at 537; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 164.
28 SL, supra note 1, at 537; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 164.
29 SL, supra note 1, at 841; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 502.
30 SL, supra note 1, at 824; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 484.
31 SL, supra note 1, at 775-824; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 429-83.
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sacrifices itself. This implies that absolute knowing—the ultimate
step—is, as negation of the negation, the sacrifice of self-sacrifice. On
its own logic. Absolute knowing shows what it is when it stops sacrific
ing itself and produces some positivized account of itself, an account in
which Geist aspires not to sacrifice itself. For this reason, in the very last
step of the Logic, Absolute idea returns to immediacy as its final act of
self-manifestation. Absolute knowing is therefore the unity of doing (or
thinking) and being. It is divine creation—what Kant called "intellec
tual intuition."^^ What it thinks truly is.
Absolute knowing is the ultimate step in the Science of Logic. Sig
nificantly, it is also the very last step in the Phenomenology. This con
gruence is significant because, in the Science of Logic, Hegel expressly
describes the Phenomenology as presupposed by the Science of Logic.
Absolute knowing stands for the realization that human consciousness is
not any basis for scientific philosophizing.^^ In effect, absolute knowl
edge "ceases itself to be knowledge."^^ It is also all the knowledge there
is—that there is no knowledge. There is only the appearance of
knowledge.

32 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 163-64 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans. 1990).
Charles Taylor says that:
Hegel reproaches Kant [is] for . . . not having cleaved to the notion of an intellectual
intuition, which he himself invented. This would be an understanding which unlike
ours did not have to depend on external reception, on being affected from outside, for
its contents, but created them with its thought. This archetypical intellect Kant at
tributed to God; it was quite beyond us. But God's intellect is ultimately revealed to
us for Hegel, it only lives in our thought. Hence we can participate in an intellectual
intuition. God's thought is ours.
TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 301.
33 SL, supra note 1, at 49; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 30.
34 Professor Winfield complains that Marx, Kierkegaard et al. miss the punch line of the
Phenomenology.
Instead of properly regarding absolute knowing as the collapse of the posited structure
of consciousness, they have commonly interpreted it as a determinate cognition that
somehow unites subject and object such that its knowing both comprehends and
constitutes things as they are in themselves. . . . Accordingly, Hegel becomes labeled
an objective idealist, a philosopher of subject-object identity, a thinker of self-re
vealing totality, and the consummator of metaphysics for whom thought and being
are one.
RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD, OVERCOMING FOUNDATIONS: STUDIES IN SYSTEMATIC PHILOSO
PHY 26-27 (1989) (footnote omitted).
35 SL, supra note 1, at 69; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54.
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HEGEL'S FIRST CHAPTER

The beginning of the Science of Logic, I contend, is the antepenulti
mate step from Hegel's last chapter. The beginning is simply the imme
diate version of absolute knowing. It is what the ultimate step of
absolute knowing, on its own logic, must produce. For this reason, the
first step is not, as usually supposed, the ultimate speculative step or the
penultimate dialectic step, but the antepenultimate step—the Under
standing, as such.
The following diagram shows the structure of the beginning in the
Science of Logic. In this diagram, the left side of the page is to be identi
fied with positivity. The right side of the page leans to negativity. The
middle of the page is positivity and negativity thought together. So

Hegel's beginning, in contrast, is an immediate proposition about
absolute knowing:
In this drawing, pure being is shown to be a one-sided view of all
the knowledge there is. In effect, the concept, if it is to know itself,
must make a proposition about itself. It must say affirmatively what it
is.^^ And, given that absolute knowing is the end of the logic, it must
recall, or remember what it is; being complete and total, whatever it
once was is now in its (timeless, logical) past.
3® Andrew Haas correctly suggests that, not pure being, but the decision of the Understand
ing to abstract pure being from absolute knowing constitutes the true first step of the Logic.
ANDREW HAAS, HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLICITY 91 (2000). Similarly, Walter
Kaufmann notes that the Logic does not really start from pure being. Rather, the Logic starts
with the privileging of the immediate over what is mediated. WALTER KAUFMANN, HEGEL: A
REINTERPRETATION 190 (1978).
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But this first thought of itself is a failure. It fails even to be a
thought, for, "there is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or mind
or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and
mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity."^^ In this recollection, the motor of the logic—contradiction—
cannot get started.'® Absolute idea perpetually turns the ignition key of
Understanding and gets no result. In an important, paradoxical way,
Hegel's beginning is a failure, as many scholars have suspected. But
Hegel makes his failure his success. The failure to have a thought at all
is the beginning of the Science ofLogic?'^ And curiously, non-thought is
37 SL, supra note 1, at 68; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 52. For Adorno, this is the equivalent of
saying there is "nothing . . . that does not contain, merely by being defined as something that
exists, the reflection of its mere existence, a spiritual moment." THEODOR W. ADORNO,
HEGEL: THREE STUDIES 57 (1993).
38 TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 243.
39 This justifies Clark Butler's insight: "Hegel's great originality was to have claimed, con
trary to Aristotle, that an inquiry starting from a false assumption could be a science, and indeed
was alone qualified to be science." Clark Butler, The Dialectical Method Today: An Essay in
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highly descriptive of absolute knowing, which is no knowledge at all.
The Understanding paradoxically succeeds by failing. And in its failure
it anticipates the final result very presciently—all immediate proposi
tions must fail.
Famously, in Hegel's opening chapter in the Science of Logic, pure
being is shown to be pure nothing.^' But this is simply the identity of
being and nothing. In the original German, the first sentence of the
subsection on Becoming reads: "Z)<w reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist
also dasselber^^ This sentence could be translated as: "Pure being and
pure nothing is the same." As John Burbidge remarks; The singular
verb reinforces the content of the sentence to suggest that there is not
movement at all, but simply a single identity.
Strictly speaking,
"[t]he indeterminate moments of becoming are not true moments; they
cannot be concretely specified, since such moments are always changing
into each other and reciprocally cancelling each other.'"^^
Hegel adds, however, "they are absolutely distinct, and yet. . . they
are unseparated and inseparable and . . . each immediately vanishes in its
Analytical Hegelianism 49 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the CARDOZO PUB. L.
POLV. & ETHICS J.). See also SLAVOJ liiEK, THE PUPPET AND THE DWARF: THE PERVERSE
CORE OF CHRISTIANITY 83 (2003) ("[0]ne has to begin by making the 'wrong' choice ... the
true speculative meaning emerges only through repeated reading, as the afterefFect (or by
product) of the first, 'wrong' reading."); Angelica Nuzzo, The End of Hegel's Logic: Absolute Idea
as Absolute Method, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y. & ETHICS J. 203 (2005) ("For Hegel progress is
made by staying where one is not by looking away aiming at something else. ).
40 Professor Winfield complains that Marx, Kierkegaard et al. miss the punchline of the
Phenomenology. See supra text accompanying note 34.
41 Marcuse is partly right in asserting, "In the foregoing analysis of the concept of being,
being did not 'turn into' nothing, but both were revealed as identical
" HERBERT MARCUSE,
REASON AND REVOLUTION: HEGEL AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY 130 (1999). But Mar
cuse errs in H>-dnring from this fact alone that "every determinate being contains the being as
well as the nothing." Id. In order for this result to follow, difference is required. But difference
cannot be found in the non-dialectic relation of pure being and pure nothing. Furthermore,
Marcuse errs in denying that transition is proper to the realm of being. A/, at 131 ( Moreover, it
is not quite correct to say that one category 'passes into' another. The dialectical analpis rather
reveals one category as another, so that the other represents its unfolded content
"). Such a
view denies difference. Transition is the very hallmark of the realm of being. Hegel in fact
defines becoming as "transition into an other." SL, supra note 1, at 601; 1 WL, supra note 1, at
240.
42 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67.
43 BURBIDGE, supra note 5, at 14. Andrew Haas reads Hegel as making a deliberate gram
matical mistake to emphasize the inability of ordinary grammar to account for speculative phi
losophy, which accounts for simultaneous immediacy and mediation. FIAAS, supra note 36, at
97.
44 PIPPIN, supra note 20, at 189.
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oppositeT^^ Any difference between being and nothing is "a merely fan
cied or imagined difference.
In other words, we mortals believe that
being and nothing is different. But belief has no purchase in logic. As
Hegel puts it, mere belief "is not in the sequence of this exposition.
It cannot suffice merely to believe that being and nothing is differ
ent. We must prove it. Where then does difference come from? It
specifically is not present in pure being, which is only identical to pure
nothing.
I contend that difference precedes pure being in origin. That is to
say, it is presupposed. Furthermore, its identification depends upon a
viewpoint that is able to comprehend absolute knowing standing against
its initial, failed self-interpretation. According to this viewpoint. Specu
lative Reason compares absolute knowing to the failed attempt of the
Understanding to account for it. It perceives a vanishing of all thought
into no thought at all. All thought is different from no thought. In
short, becoming constitutes the recollection of what once was, com
pared to what is not now—a ceasing-to-be. But since, for Hegel, noth
ing is always something, it is just as much a coming-to-be—a be
coming. Again to quote Burbidge, "The difference that 'reality' in
troduces is not the result of a simple transition, but has been posited by
reflection when it added to the immediate content ... its remembered
parentage. The move came from outside the immediate concept."^®
This implies that there is no proper beginning for Hegel. He is, as
Jean-Luc Nancy observes, "the first philosopher for whom there is, ex
plicitly, neither beginning nor end."^^ An articulation of this principle
appears in the following passage:
Simple immediacy is itself an expression of reflection and contains a
reference to its distinction from what is mediated. This simple imme
diacy, therefore, in its true expression is pure being. . . . Here the be•*5 SL, supra note 1, at 83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67.
^•5 SL, supra note 1, at 92; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 77.
47 "[D]as nicht in diese Reihe der Darsteilung gehort." 1 WL supra note 1, at 78. A.V.
Miller's translation puts it more dryly: "Opinion, however, is a form of subjectivity which is not
proper to an exposition of this kind." SL, supra note 1, at 92; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 77.
48 BURBIDGE, supra note 5, at 22.
49 JEAN-LUC NANCY, HEGEL: THE RESTLESSNESS OF THE NEGATIVE 9 Qason Smith &
Steven Miller eds. 1997) (footnote omitted); see also ADORNO, supra note 37, at 12 ("Correctly
understood, the choice of a starting point, of what comes first, is a matter of indifference in
Hegel's philosophy; his philosophy does not recognize a first something of this kind as a fixed
principle . . . .").
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ginning is made with being which is represented as having come to be
through mediation, a mediation which is also a sublating of itself; and
there is presupposed pure knowing as the outcome of finite knowing,
of consciousness. But if no presupposition is to be made and the be
ginning itself is taken immediately, then its only determination is that
it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such. All that is pre
sent is simply the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that
we propose to consider thought as such.'"
In this passage, Hegel admits that the indeterminacy of pure being
contains a reference to determinacy. Pure being cannot properly disen
tangle itself from its history. Pure being is different from its history.
Yet, as pure being, it is immediacy and only immediacy, and, as such, it
must suppress its history. But without its history, it reduces to mere
resolve to begin, and, as such, it looks arbitrary. Why should we begin?
At the beginning this is by no means clear.'' But by the end, we know
that idea requires its own manifestation. It must begin.
What pure being is different from is not pure nothing but pure
knowing—Logic's ultimate step. By way of evidence, in the subsection
entitled "Nothing," Hegel says:
To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are distin
guished and thus nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or
rather it is empty intuition and thought itself, and the same empty
intuition or thought as pure being. Nothing is, therefore, the same
determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether
the same as, pure being.^^

50 SL, supra note 1, at 69-70; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54.
51 In Professor Winfield's account, the matter must end here. Rather than viewing the true
commencement of the Logic as the one-sided proposition of the Understanding, Winfield thinks
that determinacy arises for no reason:
One could thus say that the proper answer to the question "Why is there determi
nacy?" is that there is and can be no reason, for any attempt to assign one presupposes
determinacy by treating indeterminacy as if it were a definite determiner. All that can
be offered in answer is an account of how indeterminacy gives rise to something else.
What is clear from the start is that what follows from indeterminacy must do so
immediately, which is to say, without reason, and without being determined by
anything.
WINFIELD, supra note 34, at 50. But if this is so, there can be no account for how Speculative
Reason, in arriving at "becoming," finds the tools to differentiate stasis from movement.
52 SL, supra note 1, at 82; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67.
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This passage expressly refers to difference, and what is different is
thinking and thought. Thinking stands for absolute knowing, which,
we know from Hegel's last chapter, has the active principle—personal
ity. The thought, or, more precisely, the failed thought of being/noth
ing, is passive/identical. The thought contains within itself no
difference. Difference is, however, already on the scene in becoming.
What is different is (a) the entire Science ofLo^c as embodied in abso
lute knowing and (b) the failed, indeterminate thought of being/
nothing.
Admittedly, Hegel emphasizes a movement between pure being
and pure nothing. In a passage that few have failed to miss as highly
important, Hegel writes:
What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being—does
not pass over but has passed over—into nothing .... But it is equally
true that they are not undistinguished from each other . . . they are
absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable
and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is,
therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the
other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by
a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself.'^
The past tense of pure being and pure nothing is important. Pure
being and nothing is never before us as a thought—because it is un
thinkable. It is 2i failed thought. It is retroactively theorized only. And
in support of this interpretation, it may be noted that Hegel states that
pure being and pure nothing have no separate subsistence of their own
but are only in becoming .
For this reason, becoming is not,
strictly speaking, a transition. With transition, Hegel writes, one tends
to think of the two terms, from one of which transition is made to the
other, as at rest, apart from each other, the transition taking place be
tween them."" Since pure being and nothing is less than thought, the
two terms cannot be brought together in the relation Hegel calls
transition.^®
53 SL, supra note 1, at 82-83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67.
54 SL, supra note 1, at 93; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 79.
55 SL, supra note 1, at 93; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 79.
56 See ROSEN, supra note 20, at 111 ("There is, then, never a transition 'taking place' from
Being to Nothing and thence to Becoming; instead, such a transition has already taken place
. . . .").
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Hegel refers to movement between being and nothing. Strictly
speaking, this movement has to be understood not as the movement
between being and nothing, but as the movement from absolute know
ing (or active thinking) to being/nothing, its first failed proposition
about itself.^^ This is no move forward but a move back from the ulti
mate step of absolute knowing to the antepenultimate step of immedi
acy. In describing what it is, absolute knowing must recall its
beginning. Recollection of the antepenultimate step then becomes the
first step of the Science of Logic.
Further evidence of Hegel's intent can be brought to bear. At the
opening of his essay, "W^ith what must the Science Begin? , Hegel states
that the beginning can be either mediated or unmediated but either
way of beginning is refuted in advance.^® In other words, the beginning
must fail. If it did not, then there would be no possibility of progress
beyond the beginning. "Hence the advance is not a kind of superfluity,
this it would be if that with which the beginning is made were in truth
already the absolute ....
In short, it is the very nature of a begin
ning that it must fail; otherwise it would be result—not beginning.^"
Compared to its origin in absolute knowing, the beginning of pure
being is "concentrated into this unity [that] has sublated all reference to
an other and to mediation . . .
This is what the beginning must
be—abstract and unmediated, because mediation points to some other,
prior step that is actually the true beginning. And yet this reference to
other is precisely what pure being implies. To repeat what Hegel has
said, "Simple immediacy is itself an expression of refleaion and contains
a reference to its distinction from what is mediated."^^ In other words,
in spite of itself, pure being refers to something other than itself, and so
57 This meaning underwrites Hegel's remark that being and nothing sink from their ini
tially imagined self-subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same
time are sublated." SL, supra note 1, at 105; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 92. Absolute knowing is
self-subsistent, and pure being is the Understanding's proposition about absolute knowing.
Only an overarching perspective that recalls absolute knowing and its difference from being/
nothing can see in being/nothing a ceasing-to-be and a becoming.
58 SL, supra note 1, at 67; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 51.
59 SL, supra note 1, at 829; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 489.
60 As Kathleen Dow Magnus puts it: "Implicit to the meaning of self-determination, how
ever, is the experience of not having been what one determines oneself to be. Genuine selfdetermination requires that one was not 'always already' self-determining. For Hegel, there is no
such thing as simply being self-determining." KATHLEEN DOW MAGNUS, HEGEL AND THE
SYMBOLIC MEDIATION OF SPIRIT 235 (2001).
61 SL, supra note 1, at 69; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54.
62 SL, supra note 1, at 69; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54.
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as a beginning it is a failure. This requires an overarching perspective
that can discern the difference between absolute knowing, on the one
hand, and being and nothing, on the other.
IV.

BECOMING AS THE TRUE BEGINNING

Pure being is merely identical to, not different from, pure nothing.
Accordingly, pure being and pure nothing are not even moments.
Rather, they are retrospective reflections on what must have been. As
Marcuse puts it, "Hegel says explicitly that not being but having been
{Gewordensein) is to be grasped as a becoming.
Here, Marcuse refers
to the "has passed over" remark from the passage quoted above.®^
Some have therefore suggested that becoming is the first true
thought in the logic. Gadamer is of this view, and he quotes the Lec
tures in the History of Philosophy to back it up; One has acquired great
insight when one realizes that being and not-being are abstractions with
out truth and that the first truth is Becoming alone."^^
Why does Gadamer claim that Becoming is the true beginning?
According to Gadamer, pure being and pure nothing are simply presup
positions for Becoming. They are not things in themselves. We first
think of Becoming—we cannot think the unthinkable pure being or
pure nothing. Then we reason that, if change or transition exists, it
must have changed from something. Only in becoming is difference
manifested. Yet, Gadamer says, the converse is not convincing. Why
should we think of Becoming when we light upon pure being or pure
nothing?
Yet, in so observing, Gadamer forgets that being and nothing are
unthinkable. As we cannot think them, there is little use in observing
that they do not imply becoming. What becoming/ceasing-to-be repre
sents is not the difference between being and nothing but rather the
difference between thinker and (failed) thought. Gadamer is right that
there can be no derivation of becoming from being and nothing. Being
and nothing represents a recollection by absolute knowing of what it
63 MARCUSE, supra note 10, at 15.
64 SL, supra note 1, at 83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67.
65 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC: FIVE HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES 91 (P.
Christopher Smith trans., 1976) (citing XIII G.W.F. HEGEL, WERKE 306 (1832)). See 1
HEGEL'S LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 283 (E.S. Haldane trans., 1892) ("The
recognition of the fact that Being and non-being are abstractions devoid of truth, that the first
truth is to be found in Becoming, forms a great advance.").
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once must have been. What becoming represents is ail the Science of
Lo^c ceasing to be in the Understanding.
Although the logical method depends on the sequence of Under
standing, Dialectical Reason, and Speculative Reason, Gadamer rightly
observes that the transition from being/nothing to Becoming is a special
case. There is nothing dialectical about pure nothing. On its own, pure
being and nothing is so little different that it can generate no synthesis.
Any difference assigned to it is merely a matter of subjective belief, not
Logic. For this reason, Gadamer emphasizes that pure nothing "bursts
forth immediately" from pure being. "Clearly, the expression, 'bursts
forth,' is one carefully chosen to exclude any idea of mediation and
transition."®'^
Yet, Gadamer seems to be criticizing Hegel's claim that pure being
is the beginning. The modulation between pure being and pure noth
ing, which Hegel emphasizes, is, for Gadamer, an "untenable way of
putting the matter ....
I agree that it is untenable, but I do not
read Hegel as making this point. For Hegel, the modulation between
being and nothing is not what precedes becoming. What precedes be
coming is thinking which fails to form a thought of its own being. In
stead of contemplating its own being, absolute knowing finds before it
nothing at all. In thought it has ceased to be. The beginning, Hegel
says, "is to be made in the element of thought that is free and for itself,
in pure knowingT^^ "Now starting from this determination of pure
66 GADAMER, supra note 66, at 87. In the Miller translation, the sentence Gadamer is refer
ring to is: "In the pure reflection of the beginning as it is made in this logic with being as such,
the transition is still concealed; because being is posited only as immediate, therefore nothing
emerges in it only immediately." SL, supra note 1, at 99; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 85. Gadamer's
translation renders "emerges in it only immediately" into "bursts forth immediately." Id. at 87.
See 1 WL, supra note 1, at 85 ("bricht das Nichts an ihm nut unmittelbar hervor."). A later

remark by Hegel makes the point expressly:
[TJhe transition of being and nothing into each other, ... it is to be understood as it
is without any further elaboration of the transition by reflection. It is immediate and
quite abstract because the transient moments are themselves abstract, that is, because
the determinateness of either moment by means of which they passed over into each
other is not yet posited in the other; nothing is not yet posited in being, although it is
true that being is essentially nothing, and vice versa. It is therefore inadmissible to
employ more developed forms of mediation here and to hold being and nothing in
any kind of relationship—the transition is not yet a relation. [No ground or relation
can be allowed.] The kind of connexion cannot be further determined without the
connected sides being further determined at the same time.
SL, supra note 1, at 103; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 89-90.
67 GADAMER, supra note 65, at 89.
68 SL, supra note 1, at 68; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 53.
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knowledge, all that is needed to ensure that the beginning remains im
manent in its scientific development is to consider . . . simply to take
up, what is there before us."^^ These sentences show that becoming is not
the beginning—even if it is the first determinate thought in the Science
of Logic. Rather, the collapse of absolute knowing is the beginning.
Nevertheless, Gadamer justly attacks the very question. How does
becoming emerge from pure being? It does not emerge at all. Becom
ing is absolute Imowing itself, as it stands back from its own failed pro
position, learning from its failure that when it tries to think an
immediate thought, it ceases to be in that thought and is alienated from
its product.^"
For this reason, the transition from pure nothing and pure being to
becoming should be viewed as a non-transition, since transition implies
a difference between origin and result. Hegel was aware of this when he
referred to the fact that being "does not pass over but has passed over—
into nothing ....
Pure being and pure nothing are simply what
becoming implies.
Becoming, for Gadamer, is the first successful thought and is there
fore the true beginning, because the thought of pure being is a failure.^^
But this interpretation wrongly presupposes that the beginning must be
a success. I think Hegel intends for the beginning to be a failure, con
taining a reference to some prior origin in spite of itself.
V.

CONCLUSION

Hegel aims for a presupposition-free philosophy. Logic is a circle,
as every Hegelian knows. Yet movement in Logic is a "lumpy, bumpy
69 SL, supra note 1, at 69; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 54.
70 As Hyppolite puts it, "[t]o know oneself is to contradict oneself since this is simultaneously
to alienate oneself, to direct oneself towards the Other and to be reflected into it, or more
exactly, to be reflected into oneself in the Other." HYPPOLITE, supra note 20, at 75.
71 SL, supra note 1, at 82-83; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 67.
72 Adorno agrees. He writes that, when Hegel deals with Becoming
[H]e waits until being and Nothingness have been equated as wholly empty and in
definite before he pays attention to the difference indicated by the fact that the two
concepts' literal linguistic meanings are absolutely contrary. ... [I]t is not until their
synthesis identifies them with each other that the moments will be nonidentical. This
is where the claim of their identity obtains that restlessness, that inward shudder,
which Hegel calls Becoming.
THEODOR W. ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 157 (E.B. Ashton trans., 2000).
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triangular wheel."^^ Logic progresses by dropping back and hazarding
one-sided propositions doomed to fail in advance. This is just as true of
Hegel's beginning. Pure being, which is pure nothing, is just such a
retrogression. In the methodical progress that Hegel describes, the be
ginning is a retrogression to the antepenultimate step—the appearance
of the Understanding, the faculty of immediacy. Hegel's beginning is a
failure, and that is why it succeeds.

John Burbidge, V7here is the Place of Understandingy in ESSAYS ON HEGEL S LOGIC 180
(George di Giovanni ed., 1990).

